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Post-communist Central and Eastern Europe has seen far right movements and parties gain 
considerable ground by drawing on nativist and ethnic claims to call for a return to an imagined 
past. In Romania, far right groups have been able to capitalise on a sense of injustice while also 
playing on historically negative feelings towards the Roma community. These patterns have 
been seen in Timişoara where the group Noua Dreaptă (New Right) has established a foothold 
over the past decade by emphasising claims that blame Roma for loss of built heritage and 
corruption in the administration of property restitution. The aims of this paper are to 1) examine 
the emergence of Noua Dreaptă and its use of Roma stigmatisation, and 2) consider the ways 
extreme views are normalised by appealing to beliefs and perceptions. The findings of the paper 
show that pre-existing prejudices can be a powerful force to not just target marginalised 
communities, but also challenge administrative practices and build organisational support. 
Focusing at the level of the city, it is possible to identify the way these claims can be more 
precisely calibrated to draw on concerns that circulate within the community. 
 
Keywords: Roma people, Radical Right, Stigmatisation, Timişoara, Romania, Populism 
 
Introduction 
The collapse of the totalitarian communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union saw a dramatic upheaval in expectations and opportunities among their populations. 
These regimes had generated a degree of certainty for the majority of the population, which 
was rapidly lost in the post-communist transitions (Elster et al, 1998). Continued political 
contention and change has seen incumbent regimes challenged and forced resignations in some 
countries, through the Colour Revolutions and less spectacularly following protests in Bulgaria 
and Romania (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011; Koycheva, 2016; Mărgărit, 2016). In this space, 
radical right groups have emerged, playing on themes of nationalism and ethnic purity (Mudde, 
2005; Fox and Vermeersch, 2010). These groups have been successful in gaining political 
representation in some countries (Hungary, Poland), echoing a broader rise in right-wing 
populism and disillusionment following the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 (Brusis, 
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2016; Gonzalez-Vincente and Carroll, 2017). Others have operated at lower levels, seeking to 
mobilise support to take more direct actions to reshape the social sphere (see Feischmidt and 
Szombati, 2016). It is therefore important to assess the origins of such movements, how they 
operate and the potential consequences for society in these countries. 
 
Romania is one country that has seen a flourishing of far right groups and attitudes. Politicians 
such as Vadim Tudor were prominent during the early transition period, but subsequently faded 
from view as the country joined the EU (Crețan and Turnock, 2008; Crețan and Powell, 2018). 
Pressure from the EU to adopt certain practices has led to growing resentment in a number of 
areas, as the benefits of membership were muted by the global financial crisis (Sasse and 
Beissinger, 2013). In this context, Noua Dreaptă (ND - New Right) has emerged as a 
significant group, drawing on nativism and ethnicity to advance its claims (Climescu, 2013). 
Protest plays an important role in presenting these claims to power holders, generating a shared 
sense of identity and reinforcing categorical boundaries between groups. As Tilly (2003: 132) 
has argued, the ‘activation of available us-them boundaries’ is a key mechanism in various 
forms of collective action, with boundaries activated around issues such as religion, race or 
sexual identity. Vilification and stigmatisation of Roma is one issue that animates the group, 
as they perceive that the rights of native Romanians have been sacrificed in favour of special 
treatment of Roma and other minorities. Such perceptions and associated patterns of 
stigmatisation are common across Eastern (and Western) Europe (Powell, 2008; Crețan and 
Powell, 2018).  
 
This paper delves into the forms of Roma stigmatisation adopted by the ND through an 
examination of the group’s actions in the city of Timişoara, where such claims have centred on 
the built environment and cultural heritage. The aims of this paper are to 1) examine the 
emergence of Noua Dreaptă and its use of Roma stigmatisation, and 2) consider the ways 
extreme views are normalised by appealing to beliefs and perceptions.  By connecting work on 
populism and nationalism (Mudde, 2005; Mudde, 2010; Fox and Vermeersch, 2010) with 
literature on Roma in Europe (Barany, 1998; Crețan and Powell, 2018; Hockenos, 1993; 
Powell, 2008; Powell and Lever, 2017) we link the case of Timişoara research to broader 
debates around urban mobilisation of radical right groups. Drawing on Fox and Veermersch’s 
(2010) notion of backdoor nationalism, the paper considers the way in which such ideas 
circulate and are mobilised by far right actors to support their claims. The focus on Timişoara 
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allows us to identify the way radical right groups draw on localised concerns to generate 
support, linking administrative failure to prejudicial attitudes regarding marginalised 
communities. The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections. The first section 
outlines the nature of far right movements, considering the motivations and form. It also 
identifies the role of anti-Roma stigmatization as a key mobilising tactic. The methodology 
used to identify the claims and actions of the far right in Timişoara and the limitations of this 
approach are outlined in the second section. The operation of the far right in Timişoara is 
examined in the third section through an examination of the claims presented by ND and how 
these are facilitated by the urban environment and administrative practices.  
 
Positioning Far Right Movements and Strategies of Roma Stigmatisation  
Populism has gained traction in recent times, as diverse actors and groups have sought to 
challenge established practices and institutions. This form of representation rests on identifying 
and amplifying concerns and issues among the general population – speaking to ‘common 
sense’. In claiming to support neglected issues, populist actors are able to shift the discussion, 
creating or reinforcing feelings of disillusionment or cynicism (Högström, 2014). The focus on 
common sense and the people encourages an exclusionary view, based on conformity with 
accepted norms, singling out minorities. Supporting this point, Plattner (2010: 88) claims: 
 
populist movements tend to be antagonistic to cultural, linguistic, religious, and racial 
minorities… who differ from the majority… [and are] viewed as enemies of the people 
rather than potential allies. 
 
A key motivation in defining the represented group is the ‘activation of us-them boundaries’ 
that allow the reinforcement of identity bonds (Tilly, 2003: 132). Maintenance of group 
boundaries tends to emphasise ‘a rigid interpretation of the ideas of popular sovereignty and 
majority rule’ (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013: 149). Visible minority groups present a more 
immediate and tangible target for such movements.  
 
An important part of the growth of populism in Europe has been the emergence of radical right 
groups over the past decade. Vieten and Poynting (2016: 533) argue that ‘right-wing racist 
movements are on the march across the continent, with parliamentary beachheads in a number 
of nations, as well, of course, as the possibly disintegrating European parliament.’ This growth 
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has led to attempts to understand their form and operation. A key distinction is made between 
extremist and radical right groups, based on the intensity of opposition to liberal democracy 
(Mudde, 2010). Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou (2016: 4) argue that ‘extreme 
right…designates parties and groups which have not distanced themselves from fascism’ and 
that such groups ‘understand themselves primarily as movements from below that embody the 
will of the people rather than represent or speak on its behalf.’ Radical right groups, in contrast, 
are more closely aligned to representative goals and ‘seek to transform liberal democracy into 
an ethnocratic regime, which gives supremacy to the interests of “the people”’ (Betz and 
Johnson, 2004: 313). In order to achieve this goal, radical groups seek to distance themselves 
from more extreme elements and appeal to the ‘common sense of the ordinary people’ (Betz 
and Johnson, 2004: 315) by framing their values in civic terms (Halikiopoulou et al, 2013). 
 
The motivations of radical right groups vary and are shaped by the specific context and 
perceived threats. They emerge in periods of socio-economic transition and target the losers, 
addressing issues such as unemployment, housing shortages and changes in socio-cultural 
patterns. In doing so, they construct a ‘recreation of a past, in terms of a singular, often linear, 
reading of the nation, history, culture, and people.’ (Kinnvall, 2015: 522).  Emphasising the 
loss of an idealised past also calls into question the role of incumbent elites and their failure to 
protect the interests of the people (Kinnvall, 2015). Framing their appeal in opposition to the 
establishment enables supporters to claim that support ‘does not originate in hatred against 
minorities but rather in opposition to policies that accommodate their demands and the political 
advancement of minorities’ (Bustikova, 2014: 1741). Such an approach puts further distance 
from extremist actors and strengthens appeals to ‘common sense’. 
 
The variety of radical right mobilisation raises further questions regarding their level of 
operation. Addressing the situation in Western Europe, Stockemer (2017: 1) argues forcefully 
that: 
 
Operationalizing structural theories on the success of the radical right at the national 
level implies that the effect of immigration, unemployment or any other factor… on the 
radical right-wing vote is rather constant throughout the country. However, the 
empirical reality shows that this is not the case. 
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The reality is ‘support for the far right tends to be heavily concentrated in specific localities’ 
as symbolic work is required to define the identity that speaks to the context (Feischmidt and 
Szombati, 2016: 2). While such groups are geographically rooted, Zúquete (2015: 72) notes 
that there has been a growth in cooperation at the transnational level, giving ‘rise to a network 
through which individuals circulate, ideas are disseminated, information is exchanged, 
resources are mobilized and strategies are discussed’. There has been a growth in the scale of 
far-right mobilisation across Europe, with the Central and Eastern European region seeing an 
earlier and more intense mobilisation. Mudde (2005: 162-3) has argued that extremist groups 
in the region ‘are… postcommunist phenomena, addressing postcommunist issues (corruption, 
minorities, EU enlargement) rather than harking back to a communist or pre-communist past.’  
 
The urban space provides fertile ground for the growth and development of such movements. 
Addressing the characteristics of urban social movements, Miller and Nicholls (2013: 493) 
argue against treating them ‘as distinctive movements in their own right, standing apart from 
other movements like those for civil rights or the environment’. Just as progressive movements 
exist on multiple levels and capitalise on the role of cities as ‘incubators and… platforms’ 
(Miller and Nicholls, 2013: 493), right-wing movements also utilise the opportunities 
presented. Lindqvist (2015: 39) reinforces the significance of the urban environment, noting 
‘space is not a fixed “backdrop” to social life existing outside of, or framing everyday life, but 
instead is a transformative agent in itself’. In manipulating the opportunities afforded by the 
city, movement actors seek to ‘transform places through their actions’ (McDaniel, 2014: 2). 
The socially defined nature of the urban environment means that actions taken to challenge or 
reinforce established norms and logics are important tactics. Hansen and Karpantschof (2016: 
178) argue that in Western Europe the ‘right to the city has been turned into a narrow, 
individual right, reserved for a limited economic and political elite’. In presenting their claims, 
right-wing groups challenge and reinforce patterns of exclusion.  
 
An important target of far right movements in the CEE region is the Roma community, as 
regime change, marginalisation and a specific nationalist ethnopolitics have imposed a burden 
in the post-communist period. ‘Post-totalitarian freedom’ (Hockenos, 1993) and the search to 
re-define the relationship between the state and the nation imposed a heavy toll on Roma (see 
Crețan and Turnock, 2008; Vincze and Rat, 2013). Themes and stereotypes may change over 
time and vary by context, but Roma are seen as ‘the enemy’ in the transitional Romanian 
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context (Goodwin et al, 2012). The marginal (socioeconomic) condition of urban Roma in 
Central and Eastern Europe has been highlighted in numerous studies. Their spatial reflection 
within urban ghettos is presented by a hostile environment (Crețan and Turnock, 2008; Vincze 
and Raţ, 2013; Powell and Lever, 2017; Lancione, 2017, 2018). The long-term poverty of most 
of Roma communities and their segregation has determined a lack of access to education, 
labour market and housing (O’Nions, 2010; van Baar, 2011; 2012; Malovics et al., 2018). 
Roma poverty is constructed by the mainstream society in terms that position Roma as 
responsible for their own way of living (van Baar, 2011; Maestri, 2016; Filčák and Steger, 
2014), an uneducated group that is dependent on public fares/state money (Grill, 2012).  
 
The current trend emphasising segregation through the creation of neo-ghettos has been linked 
to economic and political interests (Clough Marinaro, 2015; 2017) and attempts to avoid 
harassment (Filčák and Steger, 2014; Powell and Lever, 2017). The pressures on Roma housing 
in Romanian urban areas has been considered in Lancione’s (2017; 2018) and Chelcea’s 
ethnographic works (2003; 2012). Chelcea highlights the effects of nationalization of 
Romanian housing stock and suggests that the post-1989 housing restitution process led to 
strengthening of kinship solidarity, ancestor worship as well as intense public discussions about 
who counts as kin (2003; 2012). This is achieved through a critical engagement with forced 
evictions of poor Roma in Bucharest. Lancione’s (2018) recent work provides an 
understanding of urban precarity, embodiment and politics, identifying the ways in which it is 
both an embodied product and a producer of the urban political context. Forced evictions have 
a practical effect in removing a base from which Roma can exercise resistance, making them 
more pliant and containable (Lancione, 2017). 
 
The advent of neoliberal forms of urban governance in the post-socialist context can be 
considered a key link between far right nationalism and stigmatisation of minority groups. 
Processes of reindustrialization and deindustrialization have led to ongoing unemployment and 
a continuing retraction of public services and resources. In addition to housing policies with 
legacies linked to the communist period, the post-socialist transition in housing has 
compounded the marginality of both the poor and the wealthy, as well as accentuating actions 
of anti-Romaism and territorial stigma. Post-1989 practices of nationalism and neoliberalism 
have thus contributed to new practices of anti-Romaism. In the context of EU enlargement, a 
complex relationship between anti-Roma sentiments and racism can be seen. Scholars who 
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have analysed the more narrow nexus of race and neoliberalism (Wacquant, 2008) have also 
underlined the importance of how racialising discourses and practices have changed under the 
influence of neoliberalism and, consequently, how neoliberalism has affected the racial 
construction of ‘problem’ groups. In this respect, the historical continuity of racialising and 
exclusionary practices towards the Roma can be considered a great burden for the ‘problem 
group’ of Roma today. 
 
Identity trumps socioeconomic considerations, as even wealthy Roma are marginalised and 
seen as cheaters. The reproduction of misrepresentations is brought into the public space by 
the far right, leading to further discrimination. As a result, wealthy Roma are invariably 
stigmatised, as their spatiality reinforces ghettoisation and further emphasises stigma and 
separation. In addition, non-Roma become defensive when wealthy Roma live in central area 
neighbourhoods, which also leads to stigma (see Crețan and Powell, 2018). The building of 
large houses with turrets is part of their ‘we-image’, or identification. Middle-aged and older 
non-Roma individuals generally invalidated nationalists’ anti-Roma stigma discourses, though 
it seems that some of the young generation agree with such symbolic violence. As Powell and 
Lever (2017: 693) argue, the long history of Roma marginalisation ‘suggests much deeper and 
long-standing processes of disidentification and stigmatisation … which inform public 
attitudes and sentiments and shape public policy’.  
 
Place-based stigmatisation of Roma is an important dimension of the extremist protesters’ 
treatment of Roma. Territorial discrimination leads to stress and anxiety (Keene and Padilla, 
2014) and shame carried by those blamed (Slater and Anderson, 2012). The slogans used in 
protests contribute to these feelings. Such place-based stigmatisation undermines progressive 
social policy by pushing public officials to adopt strategies that counter efforts to support 
disadvantaged persons (Wacquant, 2008). Moreover, socially and economically differentiating 
processes between Roma and the dominant national ethnic group accumulate in 
neighbourhoods over time and give rise to actions of hatred and discrimination. Thus, external 
power relations generate a ‘blemish of place’ that denies acceptance of the Roma in the society.  
 
The presence of Roma as a marginalised group in the urban space reflects deeper antagonisms 
within society. As Fox and Veermersch (2010) argue, EU accession has reduced the importance 
of left/right divisions, enabling other claims to take hold. Their focus on backdoor nationalism 
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captures this dynamic, as groups define themselves against the EU at the national level. Such 
claims draw heavily on identity, as they attempt to bring together co-ethnics to create the 
idealised, unified state. At the urban level, claims against supra-national bodies are more 
difficult to sustain, leading to a sharper focus on localised concerns, which are still tied to 
identity. Groups seeking to mobilise support for their exclusivist claims draw on pre-existing, 
latent prejudices and beliefs, leading to a form of circulatory backdoor nationalism. In the case 
of Roma, the long history of stigmatisation means that prejudice circulates freely, providing a 
resource that can be used to target administrative failings, as well as Roma communities 
themselves, in mobilising support.  
 
Methods and empirical sources 
The empirical background of this paper is based on a mixed methods approach (Bryman, 2016). 
We use content analysis of urban policy documents released by Timişoara City Hall as well as 
discursive analysis of two daily Romanian newspapers (Adevarul, Timis online) which have 
specific editorials connected to the ND leaders’ blemish of place discourses against the Roma 
in Timişoara.  
 
Census data for descriptive context as well as housing policy documents and reports provided 
from Timişoara City Council were analysed in order to perceive how the image of Roma living 
in Timişoara’s central area and Piaţa Traian are shaped. The main public policy frameworks 
on which urban plans of Timişoara is centered are the General Urban Plan and the Integrated 
Development Plan. These urban development plans are the major empirical sources of the 
content analysis that we followed in this paper. Interestingly, although for a so-called 
multicultural city as Timişoara is envisioned by local policy-makers there is no specific 
mention about the Roma people in these documents, we were more interested to see how 
current housing policy is implemented to the city’s citizens and how former policies affected 
the local Roma population.  
 
A media and online platform (i.e. the ND website) was examined in order to better understand 
the role and discourse of the media and the far-right nationalists against the Roma and the 
territory they inhabit. Specific key-words (such as ‘Noua Dreaptă and Roma people in 
Timişoara’, ‘Piaţa Traian and Roma housing”) on the internet were initiated for the selection 
of one major national (Adevarul) and a local (Timis online) newspapers. Content analyses was 
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used to select signifiers in the nationalist discourses against the Roma and core slogans were 
presented to show different levels of contention on the Roma and their inhabited spaces. The 
timeframe of the analysis of the selected online archives of these newspapers is between 
January 2011 and December 2016. 
 
A limitation of the methodological approach in this paper is the necessity of using newspaper 
editorials. We cannot claim to have achieved a representative sample. Indeed, the two selected 
newspapers included the most relevant editorial titles we found but there were other 
newspapers in Romania that showed the events related to how Noua Dreaptă actions impacted 
on the Roma people in Timişoara. Our aim was to select quality and not quantity data and this 
was the major reason we decided to select only the two journals. Additionally, previous drafts 
of this paper included the monthly local city hall journal ’Monitorul’, where several of the 
Mayor’s editorials were highly discriminatory against the local Roma and supported Noua 
Dreaptă. These editorials were subsequently erased by the administrator of Monitorul’s website 
after the mayor was fined several times by CNCDR (the National Council for Fighting against 
Discrimination in Romania). Due to these events we were obliged to exclude this material. 
 
The authors acknowledge the lack of Roma voices as a potential limitation of the current paper. 
The decision not to include Roma voices in this paper is to enable a sharper focus on the 
narratives and strategies adopted by the far right in Timişoara and how these are used to 
stigmatise Roma as a group. It also enables consideration of the way this approach fits with 
broader attitudes, existing practices and the material reality of life in the city. There is 
considerable scope for further research to examine how members of the Roma community 
interiorise and manage this stigmatisation by the far right and how it reflects their perception 
of wider social practices. 
 
Far Right Contention against the Roma in Timişoara 
In the case of Romania, nationalist ideology developed quickly after the fall of the Communist 
regime and spread across the political spectrum. Two ultra-nationalist parties emerged on the 
Romanian political landscape: the Greater Romania Party (Partidul România Mare) and the 
Romanian Cradle (Vatra Româneasca) (Gallagher, 1995). Although neither party has had a 
significant impact on the conduct of politics at the national level, their presence has been 
important in legitimising more extreme positions. These parties are complemented by many 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Wiley in International Journal of Urban and 





fragmented but active ultra-nationalist organisations, leading to a more militant far right sector 
than in Western Europe (Goodwin et al, 2012). Although not consolidated as a unified political 
force until 2015, the far right in Romania acts through organisations or associations with legal 
personality – despite the existence of legislation against the promotion of fascist symbols, 
racism and xenophobia – and ‘sometimes in complicity with state institutions’ (Climescu, 
2013: 5). 
 
Roma feature as the target of many of the claims presented by far right groups in Romania. 
Policies of multiculturalism and inclusion promoted by public institutions in favour of ethnic 
minorities, including the Roma, has fuelled discontent among parts of the population. Right-
wing movements have used these developments as a tool to mobilise support against Roma as 
a threat to national ‘purity’ (Kuhelj, 2014). Csepeli and Simon (2004: 129) argue that the 
construction of the Roma population is ‘more or less homogenous, stereotypical and fraught 
with negative bias’, which clashes with what Barany (1998: 312) has referred to as ‘the 
amazing diversity among Romani communities with clear-cut distinctions in occupation, 
language/dialect, lifestyle, geographic location, socio-economic status and religion’. Their 
ability to challenge these external understandings is undermined by the lack of ‘effective 
formal representation, in terms of voice and presence in public life’ (McGarry, 2014: 757). A 
discourse of ‘Gypsy deviance’ emerged (Picker and Rocchegianni, 2014), stigmatising Roma 
communities as hotbeds of prostitution and begging. Although nationalist leaders have 
repeatedly emphasised these issues to attract voters and sympathisers (Crețan and Powell, 
2018) they remain anchored in localised realities.  
 
The most organised far-right movement in Romania is Noua Dreaptă (ND - New Right), which 
was founded in 1999 and uses the symbol of the Celtic cross (typically drawn on a green 
background) that is reminiscent of the insignia of the fascist Iron Guard that was dominant 
during the interwar and early war period. The group defines itself as ‘radical, militant, 
nationalist and Christian Orthodox’ (Noua Dreaptă, 2014). They use imagery associated with 
legionarism, the ideology of the extreme nationalist and anti-Semitic interwar Iron Guard, 
which was created by the notorious Hitler-admirer Corneliu Zelea Codreanu and routinely 
referenced the fascist and Nazi movements in Italy and Germany (see Noua Dreaptă, 2014). 
According to the ND, there is no place for national minorities, and ND members fight to build 
an ‘ethnocratic state’ ruled exclusively by pure Romanians; they are against the ‘Gypsy 
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danger’, are in favour of stiff punishment for ‘Gypsy crimes’ and fight to confine all Roma to 
‘reservation camps’ (Climescu, 2013). They blame the Romanian State for what is generically 
called the ‘Gypsy problem’ that has resulted from the failure of the state to counter ‘Mafia 
Gypsy’ activities and to prohibit real estate transactions concluded by Roma (Noua Dreaptă, 
2014).  
 
The motivations of the ND are also reflected in their actions, reinforcing boundaries between 
the pure, native population and the other. This leads to a situation where the group has been 
involved in performing charitable actions for some elderly living in the countryside, while at 
the same time developing a reputation for cruelty over the last decade. ND emerged as a 
localised extremist radical right group, but they have moderated their message and attempted 
to move into the electoral space with the formation of Partidul Noua Dreaptă (New Right 
Party) in 2015. The use of violence by the group suggests that rather than seeking to represent 
the interests of a particular group, they see themselves as the embodiment of the people (see 
Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou, 2016). The targets of their protests also illustrate the strong 
connection to a particular idea of Romania and Romanian identity. During the GayFest pride 
parade held in Bucharest in May 2006, Romanian police arrested dozens of ND members who 
violently disrupted the parade. Moreover, on the occasion of the National Day of Hungary (15 
March) in 2008, ND members organised an anti-Hungarian rally in Cluj-Napoca (Noua 
Dreaptă, 2014) – an action in which ND group members beat an ethnic Hungarian organiser. 
Minority groups present a simple target and enable the group to reinforce identified boundaries 
between us and them, thereby strengthening internal solidarity and communicating values to 
observers. 
 
The Roma population of Timişoara is 3,062, or less than 1.0% of the city’s population of 
317,660 inhabitants. Romanians make up the overwhelming majority of the population (85.5%) 
with smaller Hungarian (7.6%) and German (2.3%) communities also being recorded (INSSE, 
2013). Most Roma in Timişoara (about 90 percent) are poor, having a family income (around 
400 euros) much under the lowest measured gross salary in Romania (1900 RON). They live 
usually in large families (3 to 7 children) at the edge or in the poorer areas of the city. Areas of 
Roma habitation include the Kunz quarter (living in substandard conditions in the northeast of 
Timişoara), Piaţa Traian in the centre, and in the neighbourhoods of city's three railway 
stations. As in the case of Bucharest (see Lancione, 2017; 2018) and even in other urban and 
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rural areas in Romania, Roma in Timişoara have no working places or rely on lowly paid 
activities such as collecting garbage or collecting iron objects to sell for subsistence. Some 
Roma, such as those in southern part of the city, became even poorer after industrial activities 
associated with clay-brick making stopped in the post-1989 period due to competition. Roma 
access to employment is limited due to society’s stereotypes regarding Roma. 
 
At the other extreme are the wealthy Roma who either are historically wealthy due to traditional 
family wealth (goldsmiths, musicians) or become wealthy by undertaking seasonal work 
abroad (see Crețan and Powell, 2018). Wealthy Roma have used their money to build large 
homes in the central city and on the outskirts. These houses are visible in the housing landscape, 
as their owners add turrets to demonstrate pride and their ethnic identification (Crețan and 
Powell, 2018). Roma in Timişoara are largely divided into poor and wealthy, as the absence of 
opportunities means that middle-class Roma are few in number. This stratification plays into 
the prejudiced arguments that are perpetuated about Roma in the city. 
 
As a visible minority facing discrimination in society, the Roma community presents a clear 
target for the ND, as the group is able to build on existing narratives to focus their claims and 
actions. As Kinnvall (2015) argues, the strength of the claims presented can be bolstered by 
linking actions to elements of culture and history. Such a connection is apparent in ND’s 
targeting of Roma living in historical areas of Timişoara. Both poor Roma from the Piaţa Traian 
area and the wealthy Roma from the central city currently live mainly in historical buildings 
(Crețan and Powell, 2018). In presenting their claims, the ND anti-Roma mobilization 
campaign starts from the fear that Roma would build turrets on historical houses they occupy 
and abuse these buildings. In the following we examine recent housing laws to determine rights 
and responsibilities regarding property before considering how the ND has been able to 
generate anti-Roma mobilisations by drawing on existing narratives of stigma.  
 
An important development in the post-communist period was the introduction of national laws 
regarding houses that had been nationalised under the previous regime (see also Chelcea, 2003, 
2012). In the communist times after ethnic Jews and Germans emigrated from Romania many 
Romanian and other ethnic group including the Roma were offered by local authorities to be 
tenants in the former nationalised houses from central area, including the Piaţa Traian area. 
The 1990s Housing Restitution laws gave any citizen of Romania the opportunity to acquire a 
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former nationalised house. Some wealthy and poor Roma families were able to buy some of 
the former nationalised houses in central area, leading to a mixing of the population, breaking 
with traditional neighbourhood compositions.  
 
The Integrative Development Plan (IDP) – the major document of Timişoara’s Townhall – 
states that the vision of city’s development plan sits under the umbrella of an ‘integrative and 
avant-garde multicultural space’ (Paddison et al, 2015). The multicultural and diversity myths 
are reinforced in the General Urban Plan (GUP) of the city and emphasises the role of social 
inclusion of the poor (e.g., the Roma) in the modernised city community (Paddison et al, 2015). 
Such a vision strengthens anti-Roma sentiment and the idea that Roma are seen ‘as the 
marginals who seek to hide behind the cover of a highly protected minority in a liberal 
multicultural world’ (Noua Dreaptă, 2014). Data from IDP and GUP show that Roma in 
Timişoara make up only one percent of the population, while field observations show that they 
are occupying less than a quarter of the housing in Piaţa Traian. These data suggest that while 
Piaţa Traian does have a higher concentration of Roma, it is not a majority Roma area as the 
ND contends, rather the concentration enables a narrative to be constructed by stigmatising 
particular places.  
 
ND protests challenging the presence and rights of the Roma have taken place in Timişoara 
each autumn from 2011. Gathering in this way enables the group to demonstrate the legitimacy 
of the claims being presented by signifying what Tilly and Wood have called WUNC 
(worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment) (Tilly and Wood, 2009). The key claim being 
presented in the rallies has been the need to challenge the ‘Roma mafia clans’ real estate’ and 
the blemished area, Piaţa Traian. Their routes typically pass through the Prefecture / County 
Council, City Hall, and stopped at Piaţa Traian before ending in front of the Court of Justice 
(Both, 2011; Timis Online, 2011) (Figure 1). In selecting this route they are able to highlight 
the main source of their discontent while also placing pressure on the governing institutions 
responsible for managing urban planning. Press releases reveal that the ND has chosen to 
demonstrate in front of these institutions because its leadership believes that the Roma real 
estate ‘mafia’ could not seize these historic buildings downtown without ‘the complicity of 
local authorities, the police and the corrupt magistrates’ (Both, 2011). They also consider Piaţa 
Traian as a prime example of Roma overpopulating an area ‘which did not belong to them’ 
(Noua Dreaptă, 2014).  
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Figure 1 – Route of ND Marches 
 
 
In a press interview with a local ND leader it was found that the ND did not consider the 
initiative to tax cemetery turrets as an adequate measure to solve the ‘Roma problem’ (Both, 
2011).1 The local administration law on cemetery turrets in Timişoara targeted the Roma and 
conflated a general opinion with a revenge attitude aimed at the entire Roma community. He 
argued that ‘Gypsies will make money from prostitution and begging to pay taxes for turrets 
and they need better and smarter solutions’. Furthermore, he decried the changes made to the 
historical buildings in which Roma live (Both, 2011), arguing that the:  
 
Muhle house and Paediatric Hospital are part of our cultural heritage and Gypsies broke 
down their roofs, changed their facade, adding turrets... We have to put pressure on the 
authorities to stop Gypsies’ authoritarian power… They are pick-pockets and beggars 
abroad but here they have luxurious cars and estates.  
 
                                                     
1 Turrets are recognised as symbols of the Roma community (see Crețan and Powell, 2018). 
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Significantly, the ND leader stated that their organisation has nothing against the Roma 
ethnicity but against ‘the individuals behind the mask of multiculturalism, inclusion and 
tolerance who commit crimes and abuses against Romanian people’ (Both, 2011). The ND 
leader states that: ‘It is not our fault that an overwhelming majority of the Gypsy population 
prefers to steal, bully and beg instead of working. The law is too permissive towards overt 
abuses committed against normal people by ethnic Gypsies’ (Both, 2011). Headlines used in a 
local Timişoara newspaper like ‘Far-right raises against the Roma mafia estate clans’ (Timis 
Online, 2011) also seemed to deeply influence the nationalist discourse of far-right hatred 
against the Romani people. Far-right anti-Roma sentiment is thus visible in terms connected to 
‘urbanization’ of the city. The far right members slogans as ‘Down with the turrets from houses 
in Timişoara’ or the chants connected to the ugliness of the façade of Roma houses are typical 
in this respect. It is considered that both wealthy Roma housing bearing turret-styles and poor 
Roma living in low-standard houses in the Piaţa Traian and other areas determine an affront to 
the beautification of the city. 
 
Interestingly, the ND website reveals that only by such loud voices can they ensure that their 
opinions are listened to and that the audience better perceives their contention. ND leaders 
measured ‘territorial stigma’ as the best solution for alerting the authorities that Piaţa Traian is 
‘a dominant Gypsy place’, whereas increasing the number of Gypsies would ‘bring illness’ and 
create a place where ‘children are afraid to go out in the evening’ (Noua Dreaptă, 2014). Thus, 
a no-go space is portrayed in which last levels of society are dominant (see Slater and 
Anderson, 2012). The ND also offers information about the need for ‘harsh measures against 
Gypsies’ and election of more nationalist politicians who care about Romanian citizens. The 
current situation is portrayed as one in which ‘the law is very mild and that a Gypsy should 
stay imprisoned more for a delinquency like illegally owning real estate... In Romania prisons 
are so overcrowded that Gypsies are back begging on the streets’ (Both, 2011). Finally, they 
consider their protest movements had resulted in benefits for the ND as the City Council of 
Timişoara has begun an inquiry to examine changes made to historic buildings in the city.  
 
Online and written press releases characterised an identifiable variety of slogans. For instance, 
the 2011 event brought out several harsh slogans, which reiterated historical and nationalist 
stereotypes, such as Roma carrying illness and operating as criminals (‘Out, out with lepers in 
the country’, ‘Timişoara does not tolerate criminals’), who should go to jail at Jilava (one of 
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the harshest Romanian prisons, located near Bucharest) because their ‘Gypsy’ behaviour 
should not be tolerated (‘Our city does not tolerate Gypsyness’, ‘Come on, to Jilava for all 
Gypsies!’). The Roma beggar and wealthy musician stigma is also reinforced (‘Do not give 
money to the Gypsy, it goes to musicians’), thereby removing differences between Roma based 
on socio-economic status. Thus, far right groups contend that Roma are criminals, beggars and 
thieves and call for harsh treatment on this basis.  
 
An important element of ND claims is the reference to past practices, in particular the WWII 
period and the regime of Ion Antonescu (1940-44). As leader of the fascist Iron Guard, 
Antonescu organised pogroms in which approximately 11,000 Roma were murdered in 
territories under Romanian control (Clark, 2012, 305). Despite this, anti-Roma sentiment 
persists, as deep-seated prejudices reinforced during the communist period are slow to change 
(Kelso, 2013). Noua Dreaptă followed most of Antonescu’s regime principles against the Roma 
people, meaning they consider Roma among ‘undesirable populations’ which needs to be 
deported. The reference to the past and the strength of hostility to the Roma community is 
reflected in the slogan, ‘If Antonescu were alive, he would have sent you to Siberia’. The 
presentation of Siberia as a slogan including a place of deportation for the Roma harks back to 
Antonescu’s principles. Additionally, they claim that the Roma came to Timişoara from other 
parts of Romania, challenging the idea of a historical multicultural city and questioning their 
presence. 
 
At the 2012-2015 rallies, the ND’s repertoire had a ‘nationalist justice-oriented approach’. 
They commonly used the following chants: ‘Gypsies and Mafia corrupt reputation’, ‘Gypsies, 
Romania is not yours’, ‘Gypsies, get out of Traian Square’, ‘Timişoara does not tolerate 
Gypsyness’, ‘Do not give money to Roma beggars because they are criminals’ and ‘Social 
justice breaks national law’. In addition, two banners were displayed with the following 
messages: ‘No Gypsy clans in Romanian towns’ and ‘Safer cities without Gypsies’. ‘Gypsies, 
get out of Traian Square!’ is a typical slogan invoking territorial stigmatisation. Examining the 
significance of territorial stigma, Waquant, Slater and Perreira (2014: 1273) argue that it: 
 
is closely tied to, but has become partially autonomized from, the stain of poverty, 
subaltern ethnicity (encompassing national and regional ‘minorities’, recognized or not, 
and lower-class foreign migrants), degraded housing, imputed immorality, and street 
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crime. So much so that a new generic label has gained wide currency in advanced 
countries to designate those urban districts viewed as tears in, and threats to, the fabric 
of the nation 
 
Such recurrent symbolic power and violence reveals hatred of the poor and of the entire space 
inhabited by Roma. Piaţa Traian and central area of Timişoara are used as sites of contention 
because they are imaginatively considered the ‘new Roma housing landscape’ which might be 
replaced by Romanians.  
 
This ‘Roma out of place’ narrative is not new in nationalist rallies, as it reflects deeper, 
historical manifestations of racial discrimination that exist across Europe (Goodwin et al, 
2012). The blemish associated with Roma places is also not new in Romanian extremist culture 
– Roma ghettos and Roma luxurious houses have routinely been invoked by nationalist leaders 
and journalists. Consequently, urban marginalisation and the territorial stigmatisation that 
follows it targets not only poor but also wealthy Roma (Crețan and Powell, 2018). Such a 
casting of identity allows ND to continue to reinforce their categorical boundaries by removing 
nuance in the identification of groups within society. 
 
Considering the actions of ND in Timişoara it is possible to reconsider some of the themes that 
characterise far right movements. The first point to note is that the localised nature of the 
mobilisation is significant in this regard, as it enables the group to enrol commonly recognised 
beliefs within society. The slogan ‘Get Out of Traian Square!’ exemplifies this practice, as it 
draws on localised knowledge and perceptions of the current occupants of Piaţa Traian. 
Targeting the claim in this way also enables activists to use the affordances of space to 
demonstrate the connection between the stigmatised area and the places of power in the city. 
By marching past Piaţa Traian, the county council, city hall and court of justice (see Fig 1) they 
attempt to locate responsibility for dealing with the threat they have constructed. Additionally, 
marching in this manner seeks to reclaim the space and demonstrate their WUNC, drawing on 
recognisable repertoires and appealing to wider perceptions and concerns regarding the target 
group. 
 
Another feature that is central to the actions of ND in Timişoara is the designation of the ‘other’ 
as threatening to the majority. The slogans identified in ND actions centre on issues of 
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criminality (‘Roma beggars… are criminals’), identity (‘Gypsies, Romania is not yours’) and 
security (‘Safer cities without Gypsies’), challenging the right of the Roma community to be 
part of society. These efforts also seek to identify the Roma as a unified group, acting in 
concert, illustrated by reference to ‘Mafia’ and ‘Gypsy clans’ that suggest a collective that has 
the potential to threaten those outside, specifically ethnic Romanians. As noted above, 
distinctions based on socioeconomic status are obscured, with talk of mafia and clans providing 
a narrative that can explain hierarchies within the community. Difference is also reinforced 
with reference to claims regarding the abuse and supposed destruction of cultural heritage, 
through building works undertaken to alter historic buildings.  
 
The effect of ND actions is more difficult to determine and at the local level the distinctions 
between radical and extremist groups may appear to soften. The rejection and critique of the 
officials in the city administration suggests a rejection of attempts to gain electoral office and 
the links to the Iron Guard clearly manifest fascist tendencies and beliefs. However, the ability 
of the group to engage supporters for annual marches and representation of the views of their 
leaders in the media suggest that they are not as marginalised from the views of ordinary people 
as may be expected. Acting at the local level, the group is able to identify a clear target in the 
role of the administration (those in power) protecting their rights at the expense of the majority. 
The reaction of the city administration in attempting to regulate the construction of turrets may 
suggest some ability to influence developments. Such changes may also represent the ability 
of the group to tap into and highlight existing tensions within the wider population (even if not 
vocalised). 
 
The actions of ND in Timişoara confirm the contention of Feischmidt and Szombati (2016) 
that support for such groups tends to be concentrated in specific localities. Place and identity 
are key in enabling the group to mobilise support. However, the availability of recognisable 
claims regarding the threat posed by Roma to the purity of the Romanian nation suggest that 
while the specifics are shaped by the context, there is scope for mobilisation at higher scales. 
The focus here has been on Timişoara and the way in which the context has shaped their 
actions, but attacks on an anti-pride march in Bucharest and anti-Hungarian attack in Cluj-
Napoca suggest that the group is willing and able to mobilise against different minorities in 
different places as the opportunity arises, reinforcing the significance of local context.  
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The rise of far right movements has accelerated as the effects of the global financial crisis have 
led to disillusionment with politics and fostered the rise of populist actors and claims. The CEE 
region has experienced significant upheaval in this regard, as the promises of democratisation 
have failed to materialise. Additionally, the perceived transfer of political power from national 
parliaments to supranational bodies has reinforced the feeling that control has been lost (Mény 
and Surel 2002). In this environment of disillusionment, challenges to the state are increasingly 
frequent and visible (see Mărgărit, 2016; Musić, 2013). Appeals to nativism can in this way 
provide a form of security, as appeals are made to strengthen the nation in the face of threats 
(Mudde, 2010). In extreme cases, appeals to national identity can lead to large-scale conflict 
and even state breakdown (see Ritter, 2017). Claims based on identity are fostered by far right 
groups to mobilise support and acceptance for their views, leading to the idealisation of an 
imagined past and the stigmatisation of minority groups who do not fit the narrative (Fox and 
Vermeersch, 2010). At the urban scale, such claims rely on a form of circulatory backdoor 
nationalism, as they tap into rooted beliefs and prejudices in society regarding particular 
communities regarded as other. 
 
This paper has addressed radical right mobilisation through a case study of processes of 
stigmatisation against the Roma community in Timişoara. The argument presented has sought 
to challenge the basic assumptions of the theory of stigmatisation, that such stigma is limited 
to the poor, and highlight the need to understand mobilization against particular minority 
groups, regardless of socioeconomic status. Contrary to the belief that territorial stigma is 
partially autonomised from other types of stigmatisation (Wacquant, 2008; Wacquant, et al 
2014), this paper suggests that territorial, ethnic and class stigma are very much aligned, 
feeding off each other and amplifying the dynamics of nationalism. The success of ND in 
generating support was shaped by the ability to tie its claims to existing perceptions and 
prejudices that circulate within society. By drawing on culturally and historically recognised 
symbols they were able to reinforce the boundary between the Roma and non-Roma 
communities.  
 
Examining the case of ND in Timişoara also suggests a need to reconsider the clear distinction 
between extremist and radical right groups (see Mudde, 2010). The group’s actions were tied 
to localised concerns to mobilise potential supporters, looking back to idealised depictions of 
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Romanian society, thereby habituating the population to their actions and normalising the 
claims being made. Linking the stigmatisation of the Roma community to concerns around 
crime, security, and clan behaviour enabled ND to build on and reinforce feelings circulating 
within the community. The formation of Partidul Noua Dreaptă suggests a further attempt to 
normalise these claims, bringing them into the electoral arena and boosting their acceptability. 
The urban form of ND and its targeting of varied minorities in different contexts reflects its 
adaptability and capacity to tap localised concerns to mobilise support. Although the 
stigmatised group differs in each case, the process of drawing on and amplifying commonly 
accepted beliefs within society provides a base with which to generate wider support.  
 
Urban territorial stigmatisation feeds far right mobilisation and influences the treatment of 
minorities such as the Roma as undesirable subjects, generating narratives of majority 
belonging and solidarity. Viewed in this light, the recent urban anti-Roma mobilisations in 
Timişoara are significant, as they reinforce the circulation of racist attitudes and normalise the 
actions of the far right. Therefore, the ability of the state to resist far right claims regarding 
minority communities rests on its ability to overcome or challenge the circulation of beliefs 
and prejudices in society that scapegoat minority communities for social and administrative 
failings. The growing strength of the far right in Timişoara and the increasingly hostile stance 
of the city administration demonstrates the way circulation of prejudice becomes a perpertual 
process. Further research in this area should consider the strength of existing prejudicial beliefs 
and the way they circulate within society to determine how they are able to be mobilised and 
can be challenged.   
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